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Summary 
We present experiments on repeated non-cooperative network formation games, based 
on Bala and Goyal (2000). We treat the one-way and the two-ways flow models, each 
for high and low link costs. The models show both multiple equilibria and coordination 
problems. We conduct experiments under various conditions which control for salient 
labeling and learning dynamics. Contrary to previous experiments, we find that 
coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equilibria is not an easy task for subjects to 
achieve, even in the mono-directional model where the Strict Nash equilibria is a wheel. 
We find that salience significantly helps coordination, but only when subjects are pre-
instructed to think of the wheel network as a reasonable way to play the networking 
game. Evidence on learning behavior provides support for subjects choosing strategies 
consistent with various learning rules, which include as the main ones Reinforcement 
and Fictitious Play. 
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Social networks play a crucial role in the formation of political, social and economic struc-
tures, in the circulation of information and in the emergence of competition and coopera-
tion among individuals (see e.g. Mansky 2000, Rauch and Hamilton 2001, Sobel 2002, for
reviews and references on the many aspects of the economics of social networks).
The process of emergence of social networks, however, has been rarely investigated
until recently. In the last few years, on the other hand, the issue has become the object of
a rapidly growing stream of research (see Demange and Wooders 2005, for a collection of
surveys in the area). An important question in the ﬁeld concerns the process of formation
of social networks as experienced by individuals. Experimental economics is useful for the
purpose and a number of investigations is currently accruing on the topic (see Kosfeld
2003, for a review of recent works).
The present paper falls within this wave, while also crossing various branches of related
literature in game theory. In particular, the paper provides a fresh experiment of one of the
leading theories of endogenous network formation: the non-cooperative game by Bala and
Goyal (2000). This model has been recently also investigated by Falk and Kosfeld (2003)
and, with some modiﬁcations, by Goeree et al. (2005) and Berninghaus et al. (2003).
This paper diﬀers from the previous experiments, in that it draws explicit attention to
the alternative decision processes individuals may follow forming a network. In fact, this
experiment is at the cornerstone of two major ideas of the current research on individuals’
behavior in games playing, that of salience and learning dynamics (see Camerer 2003).
In greater detail, Bala and Goyal (2000) propose the leading model of endogenous
network formation in a non-cooperative setting1. They consider a group of individuals,
each endowed of a valuable, non-rival information and having the possibility to create
connections to other members of the group. Links to others are beneﬁcial because they
permit the transmission of information from them. However, direct connections are costly
too. Two speciﬁcations of information ﬂows are considered: in the one-way or mono-
directional model, an established link paid by i to j enables i to access j’s information,
but not vice versa. In the two-way or bi-directional case information ﬂow in both ways.
The theory opens up various interesting issues in game theory. A major one is a
problem of multiplicity of equilibria and coordination. In particular, Bala and Goyal prove
that in both the one-way and two-way models, several conﬁgurations of Nash equilibria
may arise. Adopting a reﬁnement based on the notion of Strict Nash equilibrium, the sets
restrict quite strongly: in the mono-directional model, depending on the link costs, the
1A seminal paper in the literature on endogenous networks formation is by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996). They adopt a cooperative game-theoretical approach to examine whether eﬃcient networks might
be formed when self-interested individuals can choose to form and to severe links of connections among
them. The cooperative approach of the game by Jackson and Wolinsky, and the consequent process of
unstructured negotiation among players (investigated experimentally by Vanin 2002), makes diﬃcult to ﬁt
our aim of also studying strategic playing in networks formation.
1only Strict Nash networks are the empty network and the wheel networks; while in the
bi-directional model, again according to the level of the link costs, only the empty network
and the center-sponsored star networks are Strict Nash equilibria.
The notion of Strict Nash, while reducing the number of equilibria and showing the
attracting feature of being closely related to the idea of Evolutionary Stable Strategies,
does not solve the question whether any coordination can be achieved in practice. The net-
working games remain indeed very complex, further complicated by the fact that the wheel
and center-sponsored star endorse diﬀerent degrees of eﬃciency and payoﬀs asymmetry,
as in particular only the wheel is both eﬃcient and payoﬀs symmetric.
As in most coordination games, experimental evidence may be useful to shed some
light on the various issues involved and on the ability of people to actually coordinate on
an equilibrium network.
An interesting ﬁrst experiment of Bala and Goyal’s model has been conducted by Falk
and Kosfeld (2003) for a four people economy. Their ﬁndings support the prediction of
the Strict Nash reﬁnement in the wheel case, but not in the case of the center-sponsored
star of the two-ﬂow model. In fact, Falk and Kosfeld (2003) ﬁnd that subjects of their
experiments show an impressive quick convergence toward the wheel equilibrium.
The study by Falk and Kosfeld (2003) uses letter labels A, B, C, D to identify subjects
in the network. It also applies an experimental protocol in which subjects are invited at
the start of the experiment to indicate the network ensuring the best possible ﬂow of
information and the maximum income of all group members. These features may have
helped subjects to coordinate on a wheel network, and to choose among the various possible
wheels the naturally ordered one in which A connects to B, B to C, C to D and D back
to A. In other words, letter labels may have been used by subjects to select an equilibria
which was salient for them, in the classical sense of Schelling (1960); (see Mehta et al.
1994, Sugden 1995, Bacharach and Bernasconi 1997, Van Huyck et al. 1997, and the
literature referred in Camerer 2003, for various recent studies on salience).
A more standard approach of equilibrium selection in games is learning dynamics,
namely equilibrium learning through repetitions (see Vega Redondo 2003, for an updated
theoretical review). Bala and Goyal (2000) themselves develop in this respect a dynamic
version of their network formation game, to show that when players follow a learning
rule made up by some mix of inertia and Cournot Best Response, both the one-way and
two-way economic networks converge to the Strict Nash equilibria.
The experiment of Falk and Kosfeld (2003) is not suited to study coordination arising
through learning dynamics, as their network experiments last for at most ﬁve repetitions.
The purpose of the present investigation, on the other hand, is precisely that to study
networks formation under conditions which control for the eﬀect of salient labeling and of
diﬀerent learning environments for subjects in the experiments.
We provide several results. We ﬁnd that coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equi-
libria is not an easy task for subjects to achieve, even on the wheel equlibrium of the
2mono-directional model. We ﬁnd that salient labels signiﬁcantly help coordination, but
only when subjects have gone through the protocol of Falk and Kosfeld, assisting them
to think about the wheel network and possibly favoring it to become common knowledge.
We interpret the ﬁndings as conﬁrming that labels may serve as focal point only if their
strategic signiﬁcance is recognized by all members of a community (Sugden 1995). We
ﬁnd little evidence of convergence to the wheel networks through learning dynamics, while
we see some emergence of empty networks in the bi-directional model, which was instead
not documented by the previous experiments of Falk and Kosfeld.
We also study various learning rules which subjects could have used in the experi-
ments2. We in particular compare the Cournot Best Response hypothesis taken by Bala
and Goyal in the dynamic analysis of their networking games, with alternative learning
rules based on models of Fictious Play (as in Fudenberg and Levine 1998, and Cheung and
Friedman 1997) and of Reinforcement learning (as in Roth and Erev 1995, and Mookher-
jee and Sopher 1994 and 1997). Various experiments have been conducted during the last
decade on the same learning models (see Camerer 2003, for a thorough review). In most
of the games studied so far3, however, the diﬀerent learning rules tend to overlap on the
same small set of strategies after few periods, so to leave ambiguous the identiﬁcation of
which theory, if any, best describes the actual learning of subjects (Salmon 2001).
The extension of learning dynamics to the more complicated network formation game
of Bala and Goyal allows us to disentangle to some degree the predictions of the vari-
ous models. Still, we ﬁnd statistical evidence that subjects prefer to follow mixtures of,
rather than pure, learning rules. Among the latter, we in any case ﬁnd more favor for
Reinforcement, followed by Fictitious Play. We ﬁnd less for Cournot Best Response.
The paper is divided in several sections. We start in the section 2 reviewing the
theoretical model of Bala and Goyal (2000). In section 3, we discuss the many questions
posed by the theory, comparing the previous experiments by Falk and Kosfeld (2003) with
various intuitions arising from the literature on salience and learning dynamics. In section
4 we present the experimental design. Results are given in section 5. In the conclusion
(section 7), we bring the various themes of the paper once more together to summarize
the main messages of the evidence.
2Notice that in this paper the term learning is used in the strcit sense to refer to the way in which
individual incentives and personal experiences aﬀect the probabilities of future choices. See Goyal (2005)
for a general survey on learning in networks, which also reviews the more recent literature on social learning
(i.e. learning from neighbours), which is an issue not considered in the present experiment.
3These among others include: experiments on the matching pennies game (Mookherjee and Sopher
1994), the hawk-dove, the stag hunt, the buyer-seller and the battle-of-the-sexes games (Cheung and Fried-
man 1997), the ultimatum game (Harley 1981, Roth and Erev 1995), the beauty contest game (Camerer
and Ho 1999), several public goods games (Roth and Erev 1995, Chen and Tang 1998), and, more generally,
games with mixed strategy equilibria (Tang 2001, Camerer and Ho 1999), constant-sum games (Mohkerjee
and Sopher 1997) and coordination games (e.g., Boylan and El-Gamal 1993, Crawford 1995, Broseta 2001).
32 The Model by Bala and Goyal: equilibrium theory
Bala and Goyal (2000) propose the following model of non-cooperative networks. Let
N = {1,...,n} be a set of agents, with n ≥ 3. Two alternative speciﬁcations diﬀering with
respect to the way agents beneﬁt from being connected are considered. In the one-way or
mono-directional model, a link created by agent i to agent j only beneﬁts agent i. In the
two-way or bi-directional model a link created by agent i to agent j beneﬁts both agents.
The intuition behind both ﬂow models is that the payoﬀ of agent i from participating
in a network, namely Πi, is increasing in the number of agents directly or indirectly
observable by i, and is decreasing in the number of links she directly pays for.
The actual payoﬀ received by i will depend on the type of informational ﬂow, on the
cost for creating the links and on the beneﬁt from being connected to other members of the
network. A basic payoﬀ function considered by Bala and Goyal (2000) and also adopted
in our experiments is a linear function, with constant marginal cost c > 0 for creating a
link, and with marginal beneﬁt from being connected to another agent normalized to 1.
It can be written as:
Πi = oi − cdi, (1)
where oi is the number of information observed directly or indirectly by i depending on
the emerging network and on the type of informational ﬂow model (and including player
i’s own information), and di is the number of direct links that i has decided to form.
Importantly, also notice that a speciﬁc assumption of the payoﬀ function in (1) is that
there is no decay in the information transmission, that is, beneﬁts from being connected
to an agent are independent on how long the path to that agent is4.
For both classes of informational ﬂow games, Bala and Goyal (2000) characterize the
set of Nash equilibrium networks.
Nash networks. In the mono-directional model, a Nash network is either
empty or minimally connected, in the sense that it has a unique component
that splits apart as soon as a single link is severed (Bala and Goyal 2000,
Proposition 3.1).
In the bi-directional model, a Nash network is either empty or minimally bi-
connected, meaning that it has a unique component, no cycle and no pair of
agents build links with each other (Bala and Goyal 2000, Proposition 4.1).
Thus, in both models, a network is a Nash equilibrium if and only if either none or
all individuals are connected with no redundant links. An issue in the result is that,
depending on the number of agents, the number of Nash networks can be quite large. For
4See Bala and Goyal (2000), section 5, for the analysis in presence of decay.
4instance, Bala and Goyal compute that with linear payoﬀs and c < 1, there are in the
mono-directional model 5, 58, 1069, and more than 20000 Nash networks as n takes on
value 3, 4, 5 and 6, respectively; in the bi-directional model, with n taking on the same
values and in the same order, the Nash networks are 12, 128, 2000 and 44352.
As a reﬁnement criterion to restrict the set of possible equilibrium networks, Bala and
Goyal (2000) focus on the notion of Strict Nash equilibrium, where each individual plays
her unique best response to the strategy proﬁle of all the other agents.
Strict Nash networks. In the mono-directional model, a Strict Nash equi-
librium is either the empty network or the wheel. In particular, if c < 1, the
wheel is the unique Strict Nash network; if 1 < c < n − 1, both the empty and
the wheel are Strict Nash networks; if c > n − 1, the empty network is the
unique Strict Nash equilibrium (Bala and Goyal 2000, Proposition 3.2) .
In the bi-directional model, a Strict Nash equilibrium is either the empty net-
work or the center-sponsored star, that is, the star where the agent located in
the centre pays all links. In particular, the center sponsored star is the unique
Strict Nash network if c < 1, and the empty network is the unique Strict Nash
equilibrium if c > 1 (Bala and Goyal 2000, Proposition 4.2).
Thus, the notion of Strict Nash networks is quite successful in restricting the set of
Nash equilibria. Consider for example networks of 4 people: i, j, h, l. As already noted,
when c < 1, in the mono-directional case there are 58 Nash equilibria, which can be
distinguished in four classes. They are shown in Figure 2.1, where following a standard
practice the arrows point into the direction of information ﬂow, that is to the person
paying the connection. The four classes refer to: 6 equivalent networks belonging to the
wheel architecture, 24 diﬀerent networks having a petal structure, 4 equivalent networks
in the star architecture, and 24 two-petals-shaped networks. By applying the reﬁnement
concept of equilibria where the set of best responses are singletons, the set of Strict Nash
networks restrict only to the 6 cases of the wheel architecture.
In the bi-directional model, for c < 1, there are 128 Nash equilibria, also of four general
classes depicted in Figure 2.2, with dots indicating the agents paying the connection.
They are: 4 equivalent networks in the center-sponsored star architecture, 4 equivalent in
the periphery-sponsored star, 24 diﬀerent mixed-sponsored star-shaped networks, and 96
possible variants of a pipeline network structure, according to the distribution of the cost
sharing among the nodes. On the other hand, the only Strict Nash networks belong to
one of the four center-sponsored stars.
With 1 < c < n − 1 (and n = 4), the sets of Nash and Strict Nash in the mono-
directional case coincide: they are the networks of the wheel architecture and the empty
network. In the bi-directional case, the Nash equilibria are the empty network and a strict



























6subset of 28 minimally bi-connected networks5. There is a unique Strict Nash equilibrium
which is the empty network.
It is also interesting to consider the relationships between the various possible equilib-
rium networks and eﬃciency. Bala and Goyal (2000) propose some important results in
this direction too. In particular, measuring eﬃciency by the sum of the payoﬀs by all the
agents, the following results apply.
Eﬃcient networks. In the mono-directional model with linear payoﬀs, the
wheel is the unique eﬃcient network if c < n − 1, while the empty network is
otherwise (Bala and Goyal 2000, Proposition 3.3).
In the bi-directional model with linear payoﬀs, if c ≤ n, a network is eﬃcient
if and only if is minimally bi-connected, while if c > n, the empty one is the
unique eﬃcient network (Bala and Goyal 2000, Proposition 3.3).
3 Material for experimental questions: previous evidence,
salient coordination, learning dynamics
The theory developed by Bala and Goyal (2000) raises various non trivial questions regard-
ing equilibrium convergence, coordination, equilibrium selection. In particular, a network
game may generate several networking conﬁgurations. For example, in a 4 people econ-
omy, every individual can choose among 23 strategies, giving rise to
￿
23￿4 = 4096 possible
networks. Depending on the level of costs, the number of reasonable strategies for each
individual can be reduced. For instance, it is easy to verify that in the mono-directional
model with c < 1 the strategy of no link is strongly dominated and therefore should
never be played; also, in both ﬂow models with 1 < c < n − 1, all strategies of more
than one connection are dominated (by either the strategies of no link or of 1 link) and
should therefore be rejected. Still, this leaves a substantial number of (22)4 = 256 possible
emerging networks. How do players select among the diﬀerent networks? Do they reach
an equilibrium? In particular, is the Strict Nash equilibrium a useful concept to restrict
the number of possible networking conﬁgurations?
Our aim is using experimental economics to try answering the above questions, focusing
on two general hypotheses about people playing games, namely salient playing and learning
dynamics. To illustrate the ideas, it is useful to start considering some recent experimental
evidence obtained for the class of Bala and Goyal’s games by Falk and Kosfeld (2003).
5The set in particular include the 4 equivalent networks belonging to the periphery-sponsored star
architecture, and 24 possible variants of a restricted pipeline network structure where any two diﬀerent
players both access the same third individual, while the remaining fourth is connecting to one of the former
two subjects.
73.1 The experiment by Falk and Kosfeld (2003) and salient coordination
Falk and Kosfeld (2003) investigate networks formation in four people economies. They
have run experiments for both the mono-directional and bi-directional models and with
both cost structures c < 1 and 1 < c < 3. In the experimental sessions, groups of four
subjects interacted to form networks in sequences of ﬁve periods; groups were randomly
formed at the beginning of each sequence; sessions lasted for three sequences.
The experiment of Falk and Kosfeld (2003) ﬁnds good support for the wheel-Strict
Nash equilibrium in the mono-directional models: just after the fourth period of the ﬁrst
sequence, more than 40% of the networks formed in the period were wheels (with little
diﬀerences depending on the structure of costs); throughout the three sequences the wheels
increased steadily and by the end of the last sequence their period-frequency was around
75%; the average of wheels on the whole experiment was about 50%. On the other hand,
the notion of Strict Nash network was rejected in the bi-directional cases: in fact, neither
any center-sponsored star was observed on the whole sessions run with c < 1, nor any
empty in those conducted for 1 < c < 3.
The authors suggest diﬀerent arguments to explain the evidence. Concerning the
rejection of empty-Strict Nash networks, they are prone to explain it with the fact that
empty networks are ineﬃcient and people may not like ineﬃciency. Regarding the failure of
the center-sponsored star in contrast to the favourable results on the wheel, they emphasize
the role of two asymmetries which are argued to aﬀect in a diﬀerent manner the two
equilibria in the two directional ﬂow models.
With the ﬁrst asymmetry, referred to as strategic asymmetry, Falk and Kosfeld notice
that while the wheel in the mono-directional model is a symmetric equilibrium, where every
subject chooses the same action, the centre-sponsored star is an asymmetric equilibrium,
where one subject maintains all links and all other subjects maintain no link. This,
according to the authors, may create more strategic uncertainty to determine who should
be the central agent.
There is some ambiguity, however, in this argument, since even in a wheel every player
has to decide with whom amongst the other agents to make a link, and also in it there is
a high chance of miss coordination6.
The second asymmetry is referred to as payoﬀs asymmetry. With this expression, Falk
and Kosfeld refer to the fact that in the wheel equilibria every subject earns exactly the
same payoﬀ; while in the center-sponsored stars peripheral subjects earn much more than
6In fact, by computing the probability of coordinating on each equilibrium under the hypothesis that
players wish to coordinate on them, one could even argue the opposite, that it is easier coordinating in
the asymmetric star case than in the symmetric wheel situation. This simply follows because in the mono-
directional model there are six equivalent wheels and each subject has 3 possible strategies of one link to
choose amongst, which gives an overall chance of coordinating on one of 6/3
4 = 0.07. On the other hand,
to set up a center-sponsored star, each subject has to choose between two strategies only, either no link
or one link to each of the other players; with four possible center-sponsored stars, this gives a chance of
4/2
4 = 0.25 of coordinating on one.
8the central agents. Thus, fairness motives may explain why the latter equilibria may be
unappealing in the bi-directional model.
We ﬁnd this argument more general convincing7. It should be noted, however, that
also payoﬀs asymmetry is an argument more able to account for the failure of the center-
sponsored star in the bi-directional model, than to explain how subjects could easily
achieve a wheel equilibrium in the mono-directional one.
A feature of Falk and Kosfeld’s experiments which may contribute to explain the latter
evidence is that the experiments used ordered letter labels A, B, C, D to name subjects
in the network. This may have represented an important coordination device for subjects
in the mono-directional model. In particular, we suggest that amongst the six equivalent
wheels which may be constructed with letter labels, subjects may have taken the one with
A connecting to B, B to C, C to D and D to A (henceforth denoted with ABCD) as a
focal point in the classical sense of Schelling (1960)8.
Falk and Kosfeld (2003) don’t report whether subjects in their experiments played
salient strategies. In the present paper we aim at testing the eﬀect of salient labels,
introducing various diﬀerent treatments which should also control for the issue of learning.
The latter is an important point, since various literature on salience has indeed em-
phasized that labels may serve as a strategic device to solve coordination games only if
their signiﬁcance is recognised by the members of the community (see e.g. Sugden 1995
for references), in the sense of being for them common knowledge (Bacharach 2001)9.
But how may subjects come to recognize the potential eﬀect of labels in the complex
game situations of Bala and Goyal networks? In other words, how do subjects learn to
play the networking games of Bala and Goyal? And may the way in which they learn have
any eﬀect on the use of salient labels?
3.2 Learning
To address the problem of learning, Falk and Kosfeld followed a protocol in which, after
the instructions and before the start of the experiment, subjects had to draw a picture
7In fact, the argument is simply a diﬀerent way of noticing that the mono-directional model is a pure
coordination game — namely a game characterized by interchangeable equilibria, exactly in the sense of
being payoﬀs symmetric (see e.g. Binmore 1992) —, while the bi-directional model it is not.
8On the other hand, there seems to be less reason to suppose that a center-sponsored star may become
more focal due to letter labels. And this for two reasons. Firstly, because the salience of (perhaps) the
A-center star versus the D-center star is clearly less apparent than the diﬀerence in salience between the
wheel ABCD versus, say, the wheel DBCA; secondly, also because the large payoﬀs asymmetry which
indeed characterizes the center-sponsored star in the bi-directional model, seems in any case to have really
little aﬃnity with that “meeting of the mind” which since Schelling (1960, p. 162) is known to typically
stay behind the notion of salient coordination. (Regardless this consideration, we anticipate that in the
present experiment we in any case control for the eﬀect of salient labeling in both directional ﬂow models).
9In this respect, it should also be noted that in most of the experiments on focal points available in
the literature (and alluded to in the introduction, including Mehta et al. 1994, Bacharach and Bernasconi
1997, Van Huyck et al. 1997, and the others referred in Camerer 2003), the condition of common knowledge
about the strategic signicance of labels was favored by the simplicity of the game-situation, which often
concerned very simple pure coordination games, like two-persons matching games.
9of a network indicating the links each subject had to form “to ensure the best ﬂow of
information and the maximum income of all group members”10. Answering the question
may have cleary enhanced subjects’ understanding of the characteristics of the networking
games. In addition, since all participants knew that the other participants were also
answering the same question, the procedure may have also favored the formation of some
commong knowledge among the participants about what to do in the experiments and of
the potential use of letter labels.
As alluded to in the introduction, a more standard approach to learning, which gives
minimum concession to deductive reasoning and is independent of labels, is that of learning
dynamics. In this approach, learning is simply deﬁned as “an observed change in behaviour
owing to experience; and learning rules aim at predicting how probabilities of future choices
are aﬀected by historical information” (Camerer 2003, p. 265).
In theoretical contributions, the focus is primarily on learning rules as possible driving
forces for equilibrium convergence, as only equilibria which can be learned according to
some rule are regarded as useful or interesting (see e.g. Vega Redondo, 2003). The latter
is indeed a point also explicitly considered by Bala and Goyal’s paper11, who provide a
model of equilibrium convergence for their games based on the following modiﬁed version
of the Cournot Best Response dynamics.
The network formation game is repeated in each time period t = 1,2,... In each period
t > 2, each subject observes the network which has been formed in the previous period.
Bala and Goyal then assume that with some ﬁxed probability ri ∈ (0,1) agent i exhibits
inertia in her decision, in that she maintains the strategy chosen in the previous period.
On the other hand, with probability pi = 1 − ri, she chooses a myopic pure best
response strategy to the ones played by all the other agents in the previous period. In case
there is more than one best response, each of them is chosen with positive probability.
Various theorems are given by Bala and Goyal showing that, for the case of linear
payoﬀ, the above dynamics converge to the Strict Nash equilibria in both the mono-
directional and bi-directional ﬂow models and for any cost structure. Moreover, Bala and
Goyal also run some simulations to test their predictions. The simulations are for all
agents having the same probability pi = p to choose a naive best response strategy and
the same function assigning equal probability to all best responses given a network. Table
1 shows the results of the simulations for a 4 people economy and various values of p. (The
table reports averages from 500 simulations with standard errors in parentheses).
In the mono-directional models, the rates of convergence are very rapid regardless the
structure of costs, reaching the wheel (when c < 1) and either the wheel or the empty
10See also section 4.1 on the experimental design with Figure 2 on the exact display of the question used
by Falk and Kosﬂed (2003) and adopted in one of the treatments conducted in the present experiment.
11At the outset of their paper, Bala and Goyal (2000) in particular note: “While these ﬁndings — those
on Strict Nash equilibrium — restrict the set of networks sharply, the coordination problem faced by
individuals in the network game is not entirely resolved... This leads us to study the process by which
individual learn about the network and revise their decisions on link formation, over time” (p. 1184).
10Table 1: Rates of convergence to the Strict Nash equilibria when n = 4 for mixtures of




1 < c < 3
Bi-directional
c < 1
p = 0.2 23.23(0.68) 11.52(0.38) −
p = 0.5 12.71(0.37) 5.98(0.18) 318.23(22.93)
p = 0.65 − − 71.34(4.93)
p = 0.8 13.14(0.42) 6.77(0.22) 17.55(1.02)
p = 0.95 − − 14.83(0.53)
network (when 1 < c < 3) in at most 23 periods and often quicker than that. In the
bi-directional model, the simulations are only provided for the case in which the Strict
Nash is the center-sponsored star (c < 1). The results show that the rates of convergence
are generally higher than in the mono-directional model. Convergence seems in addition
to require that players adopt Cournot best responses with some larger probabilities12.
The above are interesting results, though clearly based on a very speciﬁc model of
learning behavior, which in addition is assumed to be the same across all agents partic-
ipating in a network. As however noted in the introduction, the literature on learning
behavior in games is wider13; alternative learning rules, in addition, may not necessarily
lead to an equilibrium. Conversely and furthermore, the experiments of Falk and Kosfeld
indicate that — perhaps with the help of salient coordination — convergence can even be
quicker than that implied by the modiﬁed Cournot Best response.
Overall, the above discussion thus gives a very complex picture of the various forces
which may drive people’s behaviour in the Bala and Goyal class of games. We now present
an experiment which we have conducted in diﬀerent waves, precisely with the purpose of
keeping tracks of the various possible eﬀects.
12The intuition for the result can be better understood by initially taking p = 1, so that there is no inertia.
Suppose now that the initial network is an empty one; in the following period all agents will simultaneously
choose to form links with the rest of society, thus forming a complete network with redundant links and
opportunity for free riding. Thus, each agent will form no links in the subsequent period. In this case, the
dynamics will oscillate between the empty and the complete network. A similar response would occur as
long as p is close enough to 1, for instance p = 0.75, with the only diﬀerence that in the latter case all but
one agent happens to move, leaving that agent as the unique sponsor of a center-ﬁnanced star. On the
other hand, when p is small, few agents move simultaneously, thus making rapid oscillations unlikely and
greatly reducing the speed of convergence.
13More on alternative learning models in the section with the results.
11Table 2: Equilibrium and eﬃciency predictions in the four network models


































4.1 Design: three experimental waves
We have run experiments implementing various diﬀerent versions of the network formation
game proposed by Bala and Goyal. All the experiments look at the four people networks.
We have treated both the mono-directional and the bi-directional models under two diﬀer-
ent costs of link formation, one with c = 0.5 and one with c = 1.5, and with the marginal
beneﬁt for each player from observing an information normalized at 1, as in equation (1).
Henceforth, we refer to the experiments run under the mono-directional speciﬁcation in
the two costs conditions as to m0.5 and m1.5 (with the obvious correspondences) and to
the experiments run under the two cost conditions for the bi-directional case as to b0.5
and b1.5. The equilibrium and the eﬃcient predictions for all the four network models
follow from the discussion in section 2 and are summarized in Table 2.
Subjects’ payment for participating in the experiment were given by the payoﬀ points
accumulated across all the network formation stages of an experimental session, converted
at a rate of 0.5 Euro per point.
The four models have been tested under three main waves of experimental treatments
(see Table 3), diﬀering in regard to two main sets of parameters: the ﬁrst concerns the
labels used to identify subjects in the experiments, while the other applyies to the learning
environment for subjects in the experiments.
The ﬁrst two waves have been run to simulate closely Bala and Goyal (2000) dynamic
version of the networking games, namely treated as repeated games with inﬁnite horizon.
Participants in these treatments were not allowed to know either how many periods the
sessions were going to last, or which round was the last one. Following a standard practice
to deal with inﬁnite horizon games in the lab, subjects were simply told that they were
12Table 3: Experimental treatments





m0.5 : 3 groups × 18 periods,
3 groups × 17 periods
m1.5 : 3 groups × 22 periods,
3 groups × 19 periods
b0.5 : 3 groups × 19 periods,
3 groups × 21 periods





m0.5 : 3 groups × 14 periods,
3 groups × 18 periods
m1.5 : 3 groups × 16 periods,
3 groups × 21 periods
b0.5 : 3 groups × 17 periods,
3 groups × 18 periods
b1.5 : 3 groups × 12 periods,
3 groups × 17 periods
Wave 3:
Short interaction /
neutral and letter labels /
FK protocol
m0.5, m1.5: 5 groups reshuﬄed
every 3 sequences of 5 periods
each
interacting with the same group of subjects (though they didn’t know the actual identity
of the other group’s members) and that at some stage the game would end. As actual
stopping device, we used a mechanism which is partly random and partly allows to run the
game for a signiﬁcant number of rounds: each treatment was automatically stopped with
a probability which was 0 until no subject had gained at least 15 Euros for participating
to the experiment and reached a value of 1 when at least one subject had gained 25 Euros.
The main diﬀerence between the experiments conducted in the ﬁrst two waves concerns
the use of label to identify subjects in the experiments: in particular, in the experiments
of Wave 1 subjects in the networks were identiﬁed by the symbols @, #, ∗, %, which
we considered neutral in that they do not provide subjects any clue when deciding to
establish a link with an other person of the group. With the experiments of Wave 2 we
have introduced the ordered letter labels A, B, C, D, which, as argued in section 3.1, may
serve as salient coordination device in the mono-directional model, if subjects recognise
their implications for the networking game14.
In the latter regard, a further important common characteristic of the experiments of
the ﬁrst two waves was the minimum concession given to subjects to favoring any speciﬁc
way of thinking or looking at the networking games. In particular, detailed instructions
were given and read aloud to subjects, both about the working of the networks and of
the software used to run the experiment15. No protocol, however, was administered with
14In fact, we run the ﬁrst experiments of Wave 1 in October 2003, before we came to know about Falk
and Kosfeld (2003)’s paper; for us it was natural to use neutral labels. We started to be interested in the
connection between learning and salience only after the dramatic diﬀerence in the results found between
the experiments of Wave 1 (see below) and those which we came in the meantime to know reported by
Falk and Kosfeld.
15A set of instructions and other material used to administered the experiments are given in Appendix
A.
13Figure 2: The ﬁnal question of Falk and Kosfeld (2003) protocol included in Wave 3
experiments
What links should, in your opinion, be formed to ensure the best possible flow of  information
and the maximum income of all group members?





Please insert these links in the following diagram:
A B
  C  D
What were your considerations?
the instructions, in particular with the question used by Falk and Kosfeld (2003), asking
subjects “to depict the links ensuring the best ﬂow of information and the maximum
income of all group members”(see Figure 2).
We run the experiments of Waves 1 and 2 with six groups of four individuals (in
sessions of three groups each) for both the mono-directional and bi-directional models,
and for both the low and high cost conditions. Table 3 summarizes for the various groups
the length of interactions which resulted from the stopping device used to end the games:
on average each session lasted for about 18 periods, which is a length consistent with
our expectation to dispose of treatments long enough to study the issue of dynamics and
equilibrium convergence in the games.
Wave 3 was conducted to reproduce the environment used by Falk and Kosfeld (2003),
while still controlling for the eﬀect of salient labelling and separately identifying it from
that of learning dynamics: for Wave 3, we have shortened the period during which partici-
pants could interact within the same group, forcing subjects to change partners and labels
every ﬁve periods and we have included at the end of the instruction the question shown
in Figure 2 adopted from the Falk and Kosfeld protocol (FK protocol henceforth)16.
We use this environment only for the mono-directional speciﬁcation, for both cost levels
and types of labelling. All the experiments in this treatment were run for ﬁve groups of
16The complete protocol we have taken from Falk and Kosfeld (2003) includes also two more neutral
questions asking subjects to depict links in two network examples. (The complete protocol is available
with the instructions from Appendix A).
14four individuals and lasted for three sequences of ﬁve periods. Subjects knew the length
of each sequence, but not the number of sequences in a session.
4.2 Running the experiment
All experimental sessions were run at the lab of the University of Insubria, in Varese (Italy).
A total of 272 subjects participated in the experiments. All subjects were students of the
second and third year of the undergraduate program in economics. No subject participated
in more than one session. As noted, subjects were paid according to the sum of payoﬀs
points earned in the whole treatment, with no show-up fee. On average subjects received
18.4 Euros. A session, including reading of instructions, lasted about 1 hour and 3/4
quarters on average.
Upon arrival to the lab, subjects were randomly seated in front of a terminal, given
a set of instructions, a pen and a set of sheets of paper. Instructions were orally read
by the instructor and time for questions was given. In Wave 3 experiments, subjects also
performed the FK protocol.
At the beginning of each treatment, subjects were randomly assigned to one of the
groups of four people. They did not know the identity of the other members in the group.
During the experiment, each subject of any group was identiﬁed exclusively by her own
label (either the neutral @, #, ∗, %, or the ordered A, B, C, D), which was revealed to her,
and uniquely to her, by her own computer terminal in the ﬁrst screen of the experiment.
In any period and treatment, each subject could simultaneously form direct links to
any of the members of her group, including herself, thus choosing to build from zero to
four connections. This gives the subjects an inﬂated strategy set of 16 possible strategies.
We did this in order to control for the basic understanding of the games by subjects in
the experiment. The link formation stage was implemented with the help of a second
computer screen, which displayed all the labels for the members in the group together
with an empty box. To form a connection with a particular group member, a subject had
to ﬁll in the box entering a 1 command, while entering 0 meant the subject did not want
to form a link with that member. In the screen was also reminded the cost of formation
of each direct link, together with the individual identiﬁcation label of the subject herself.
After all subjects had decided their connections, a network formed and the computer
program calculated all the payoﬀs for each member of the group, given that network.
Subjects were then presented a third screen on their terminal. The screen informed
about all the direct links each of the members of the group had formed in that period,
with the payoﬀ points gained in that period by each member of the group.
The screen didn’t, however, provide any explicit ﬁgure of the formed networks. In
order for subjects to better understand the nature of the networking game, subjects were
instead encouraged to draw themselves the actual networks on sheets of paper provided for
the purpose. The above procedure is similar, but lighter to the one employed by Falk and
15Kosfeld (2003), who insisted that subjects were obliged to draw the correct network and
that the correct drawing was a prerequisite for payment on completion of the experiment17.
After subjects had read the information on the third screen and reported it on the sheet
of paper, they were asked to press an OK button on the screen. Once all the subjects had
pushed that button, the terminal presented the screen for a next period. The session then
proceeded in the same way until the treatment was interrupted.
We used the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999) to design and to run
the experiment.
5 Experimental evidence
Below we report the main ﬁndings from the above experiments. We split the analysis
into two main parts. Firstly we focus on the evidence on group behavior and equilibrium
selection in a static and in a dynamic perspective; we then move to analyze individual
behaviors, to better understand the reasons behind the group evidence.
5.1 Group behavior and equilibrium selection
5.1.1 Results in a static perspective
Table 4 reports the overall frequencies of observed Nash, Strict Nash and Eﬃcient net-
works, across the various treatments for both the mono-directional and bi-directional
models. There are diﬀerences amongst treatments, but there are also some results hold-
ing in the aggregate which are worthwhile to point out. At the general level, we wish in
particular to draw attention on three aspects of the evidence.
First of all we observe that the occurrence of Nash, Strict Nash and Eﬃcient networks
tend to be modest in all experiments: the highest proportion is 22.7% of Nash equilibria
in the m0.5 game of Wave 3 with ordered labels; the lowest is 0 of observed Strict Nash
networks in the b0.5 experiments of both Waves 1 and 2. As compared to the predictions of
the static theory reviewed in Section 2, this result thus conﬁrms the diﬃcult coordination
problem involved in the Bala and Goyal games.
Looking, however, in greater details across the diﬀerent equilibrium notions, we observe
that in both the mono-directional and bi-directional treatments only that of Strict Nash
equilibria seems able to capture some fractions of group behavior18; but not similarly in
17We have neverthelss checked after the experiment subjects’ drawing sheets and have veriﬁed that the
great majority of subjects drew indeed the networks and they were the correct ones.
18This second result is in particular supported by the following observations: i) in the mono-directional
games we see that out of a total of 83 Nash networks across all experimental conditions, 75 (90% of the in-
stances) are wheels, namely Strict Nash networks, which are also eﬃcient networks; ii) in the bi-directional
model with low cost (b0.5), no Strict Nash (centered-sponsored star) network is observed in either treat-
ments of Wave 1 and Wave 2, while Nash and eﬃcients networks are observed without any regularity in
the shape of the minimally bi-connected networks (in addition, we anticipate from the subsection on equi-
librium convergence that none of the above Nash networks have become points of convergence for subjects
16Table 4: Overall frequencies of Nash, Strict Nash and eﬃcient networks
Wave 1: Long interaction / neutral label / no FK protocol
m0.5 m1.5 b0.5 b1.5
Nash networks 11 (10.5%) 3 (2.4%) 23 (19.2%) 22 (18.3%)
(10 w.; 1 pt.) (3 w.) (8 ps.; 10 p.; 5 msss.) (19 Ø; 3 rp.)
Strict Nash networks 10 (9.5%) 3 (2.4%) 0 19 (15.8%)
(10 w.) (3 w.) (19 Ø)
Eﬃcient networks 10 (9.5%) 3 (2.4%) 23 (19.2%) 9 (7.5%)
(10 w.) (3 w.) (8 ps.; 10 p.; 5 mss.) (5 p.; 4 mss.)
Total 105 123 120 120
Wave 2: Long interaction / ordered label / no FK protocol
m0.5 m1.5 b0.5 b1.5
Nash networks 15 (15.6%) 13 (11.7%) 22 (21.0%) 15 (17.2%)
(13 w.; 2 pt.) (13 w.) (10 ps.; 4 p.; 8 mss.) (11 Ø; 4 rp.)
Strict Nash networks 13 (13.5%) 13 (11.7%) 0 11 (12.6%)
(13 w.) (13 w.) (11 Ø)
Eﬃcient networks 13 (13.5%) 13 (11.7%) 22 (21.0%) 7 (8.0%)
(13 w.) (13 w.) (10 ps.; 4 p.; 8 mss.) (5 p.; 2 mss.)
Total 96 123 105 87
Wave 3: Short interaction / neutral & ordered label / FK protocol
Neutral label Ordered label
m0.5 m1.5 m0.5 m1.5
Nash networks 4 (5.3%) 7 (9.3%) 17 (22.7%) 13 (17.3%)
(3 w.; 1 pt.) (7 w.) (13 w.; 3 pt.) (13 w.)
Strict Nash networks 3 (4.0%) 7 (9.3%) 13 (17.3%) 13 (17.3%)
(3 w.) (7 w.) (13 w.) (13 w.)
Eﬃcient networks 3 (4.0%) 7 (9.3%) 13 (17.3%) 13 (17.3%)
(3 w.) (7 w.) (13 w.) (13 w.)
Total 75 75 75 75
Legend: The numbers and letters in brackets report the shape of the networks. Letters stand
for: w = wheel; pt=petal; tp=two-petals; mss=mixed-sponsored star; p=pipeline; ∅=empty;
rp=restricted pipeline
17the two ﬂow models.
Indeed, the third general point is that non empty Strict Nash networks occur only in
the mono-directional experiments (with an overall frequency of 10.2% — 75/735 — wheels
on the aggregate of both the m0.5 and m1.5 experiments across all waves); while in the
bi-directional experiments only empty Strict Nash networks are observed (at the overall
rate of 14.5% — 30/207 — networks in the b1.5 experiments of Waves 1 and 2).
We notice that while the latter evidence may not be seen as generally contradictory
with the ﬁndings reported by Falk and Kosfeld (2003), it is also far to be completely
consistent: ﬁrst of all, because the rates of coordination in the mono-directional model of
the present experiment are signiﬁcantly lower than those reported by Falk and Kosfeld
(which were of the order of about 50% wheels on the whole networks); secondly, because
Falk and Kosfeld have not found any empty networks in either the mono-directional or
the be-directional ﬂow models.
Comparing now the equilibrium frequencies across treatments, we observe: a) in the
neutral labeling experiments of Waves 1 and 3, the proportions of wheels in both the m0.5
and m1.5 experiments are very low in both waves (on the aggregate of the two cost models,
they are 5.7% — 13/228 — in Wave 1, and 6.6% — 10/150 — in Wave 3); b) the frequencies
of wheels increase in the ordered labeling treatments of Waves 2 and 3; the increase is
more pronounced in Wave 3: on the sum of both the m0.5 and m1.5 experiments, the
wheels account for 11.9% (26/219) of the observations in Wave 2 and 17.3% (26/150) in
the ordered tratments of Wave 3: both proportions are signiﬁcantly higher than the rates
for the neutral treatments in the corresponding learning conditions19; c) the frequencies of
empty networks in the b1.5 experiments are higher in sessions of Wave 1 with the neutral
labels (namely 15.8% of all networks) rather than in experiments of Wave 2 with ordered
labels (12.6%); but the diﬀerences of proportions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
The above results thus conﬁrm that there are diﬀerences across treatments; and some
diﬀerences go also in the expected direction, like, in particular, the eﬀect of ordered labels
to increase the frequencies of wheel coordination, even if not at the rates observed by
Falk and Kosfeld. The evidence from Table 4 refers however only to static frequencies.
It is now important to look how groups have dynamically played the games, because the
whole picture may oﬀer diﬀerent interpretations depending on whether subjects’ dynamic
playing would reveal, with repetitions, some substantial convergence toward the equilib-
in the sessions); iii) in the bi-directional experiments with high cost (b1.5), the only Nash network which
is observed with some shape regularity is the empty Strict Nash network (with an overall frequency in
the two b1.5 of Waves 1 and 2 of 14.5%(19+11)/(120+87)). In other words, in both the mono-directional
and bi-directional treatments, that there are essentially no Nash or Eﬃcient networks observed with some
regularity, which are not also Strict Nash.
19In particular, the proportion of 11.9% wheels in the aggregate of the m0.5 and m1.5 experiments of
Wave 2 is signiﬁcantly higher than the proportion of 5.7% wheels in the corresponding neutral treatments
of Wave 1 (with a p < 0.01); the evidence is stronger in regards to the experiments of Wave 3, for the
diﬀerences between the proportions 17.3% and 6.6% (with a p < 0.001), in the ordered and neutral labeling
conditions, respectively.
18ria. Furthermore, it is important to check in more detail the impact of ordered labels,
because the hypothesis suggested in section 3.2 was that subjects might use ordered labels
strategically to coordinate (in the mono-directional models) on the salient wheel ABCD.
5.1.2 Results in a dynamic perspective, with the eﬀect of ordered labels
Figure 3 provides evidence on the extent to which subjects managed to “converge” toward
the equilibrium networks in the various treatments. In particular, here and in the following
with term “converge to an equilibrium network” (or, alternatively, “learn” or “settle on”
an equilibrium network), we mean the evidence of a group playing an equilibrium at some
stage of a session, and then going on to play the same equilibrium for all repetitions until
the end of the session.
In Wave 1 we see that ﬁve groups have coordinated in the mono-directional experiments
on a wheel at some stage of their sessions; but only in two cases (namely, Groups 4 and
6 in m0.5) they seem to have learned toward the end of the session (around repetitions
15 and 16) to settle on the equilibria. In the bi-directional model with low cost (b0.5),
various Nash-Eﬃcient equilibria (not-Strict) have been played, but they have never become
points of convergence (thus giving further conﬁrmation that Nash equilibria which aren’t
also Strict are unable to capture people’s behavior). On the other hand, the empty Strict
Nash equilibrium in b1.5 has become for two groups a point of convergence toward the
end of the session (around stage 15 on the average of the two groups). As already noted,
this is an evidence contrasting with the previous results of Falk and Kosfeld (2003), which
were however based on shorter groups’ interaction.
Introducing ordered letter labels in Wave 2 conﬁrms to have little eﬀects in the bi-
directional models, with the diagrams showing no type of convergence toward any equi-
librium in the b0.5 case, while two groups converging toward the empty network in the
b1.5. In the mono-directional models, we see a bit more of convergence in Wave 2 than
in Wave 1, with, in particular, 3 (rather than 2) groups converging to the wheel equilib-
rium, and a bit quicker (around on average repetition 10). Regarding this treatment with
ordered labels, it is also important to look at the type of wheels formed by the groups
(they are reported in the caption at the bottom of the Figure): interestingly, none of the
wheel established in the experiments is of the salient type ABCD, but they occur somehow
randomly amongst all the other possible wheels20.
The evidence in the mono-directional experiments of Wave 3 with neutral labels shows
that convergence has occurred within only two groups (Group 4 in the experiments of
m0.5 and Group 1 in m1.5). In the ordered label case the evidence is diﬀerent from the
previous treatments in various respects. First of all, a greater number of groups (namely
20Of course, one may also be interested to check not only whether the wheels are of the salient type,
but also whether some substantial proportion of players have anyhow played salient strategies. This issue
is dealt with in the next section on the results of individual plays.
19Figure 3: Dynamics of networks in the three experimental waves







































Wave 1: Long interaction / neutral label / no FK protocol
.
Symbols. • Wheel networks (Non-empty Strict Nash, only in m0.5 and m1.5); × Nash not-Strict and
not-Eﬃcient networks; ∗ Nash-Eﬃcient networks (not-Strict); + Eﬃcient not-Nash networks; ◦ Empty
networks (Strict Nash only in b1.5)







































Wave 2: Long interaction / ordered label / no FK protocol
.
Symbols as above. In m0.5 the wheels are of the following type: all 8 wheels of Group 1 are ADBC, all 5
wheels of Group 4 are ADCB; in m1.5 all 9 wheels of Group 1 are ACBD; the single wheel of Group 3 is
ADCB; one wheel of Group 6 is ADBC, the other is ACBD.
Continued next page →
20Figure 4: continued
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Wave 3: Short interaction /  ordered & neutral labels /  FK protocol
Symbols as above. The wheels in the ordered treatments are of the following types: in m0.5, the single
wheel of Group 1 in sequence 2 (at period 2) is ADBC, all other wheels are ABCD; in m1.5 all 13 wheels
are ABCD.
10) have coordinated at some stage on a wheel equilibrium21. Secondly, we see that a
greater number of groups have converged to an equilibrium, at least ﬁve (but perhaps also
Group 2 in phase 1 and Group 3 in phase 3 of the m1.5 experiments have in fact converged
in the last period); thirdly and most interestingly, all but one of the 25 wheels observed
in this treatment, even of those groups which haven’t settled on a wheel equilibrium, are
of the salient type ABCD (see the caption at the bottom of the ﬁgure). We note that the
eﬀect here is highly signiﬁcant and cannot be attributed to a pure chance22. In addition,
we emphasize that all subjects in this treatment answered the question of the FK protocol
about which network could ensure the best ﬂow of information and the maximum income
of all group members by in fact drawing the salient wheel ABCD23.
21We have already observed that the frequencies of wheels in this ordered label treatment is signiﬁcantly
greater (with p < 0.001) than the frequencies of wheel in the corresponding previous treatment with neutral
labels.
22In particular, we conducted the following test. Consider the probability of observing one wheel of the
salient type ABCD, when a group is playing a wheel equilibrium. The probability is 1/6. We observe 24
wheels of the salient type over 25 wheels. Since, however, some wheels are simply repetitions of wheels
played in the previous period, for the test we only count wheels played at round t, when no wheel was
played at round t−1. There are 13 of such wheels, of which 12 are salient. Their proportion is 0.92, which
is signiﬁcantly greater than 1/6 at p < 0.001 (one-tailed test based on the binomial distribution).
23In fact, we note that also the subjects participating in the mono-directional experiments with neutral
21In the latter respect, an obvious question is then about the reason why subjects haven’t
played more often the salient wheel. A related one concerns of course also the reason why
the observed wheels remain, even in this treatment, signiﬁcantly lower than the rates
reported by Falk and Kosfeld. Possible explanations may lay in further diﬀerences in
the conduction of the experiments (in addition, obviously, to the subjects’ pools). For
example, we already noticed that we implemented a lighter procedure to check subjects
drawing of the networks (see Section 4.2); we also carefully checked ex-post the instruc-
tions between the two experiments and noticed that Falk and Kosfeld referred more often
than we did to subjects in the networks as “group members”. This might have induced
their subjects to feel a somehow stronger commitment toward their groups and hence
more predisposed to always take their own part in the salient wheel24. In fact, a similar
explanation may perhaps also contributes to explain why the subjects of Falk and Kosfeld
were so reluctant to ever play an empty network, even in the bi-directional experiments
with high connection costs. In the present experiment subjects might have instead played
more individualistically, perhaps even thinking about the possibility of doing better than
in a wheel in the mono-directional case, possibly not fully understanding the full force of
the Strict Nash equilibrium or in any case experimenting with various strategies in the
course of the sessions.
More generally, the questions are here about the way in which individuals, rather than
groups, have understood, played and learned in the games of the present experiments; and
to such questions we now turn the attention.
5.2 Individual behavior
5.2.1 Link-strategies
We start looking at individuals’ behavior by analyzing the number of links established by
players across the various treatments. This is an important issue for various reasons. First
of all, it serves to test some basic hypotheses about subjects’ rationality and comprehension
of the networking games. In particular, recall that depending on the characteristics of
the games, some strategies are dominated by other strategies and should therefore not be
played by subjects. Speciﬁcally, the strategy of no link is a dominated strategy in the m0.5
model; while any strategies of more than one link is dominated (by either the strategy of
one link or of no link) in both the m1.5 and b1.5 cases.
Table 5 reports the frequencies of link-strategies established by players across the
various treatments. The ﬁgures show that indeed very few subjects played dominated
strategies25.
labels of this Wave 3 depicted wheels; however, since the symbols @, %, #, ∗ were randomized across
subjects (and subjects were informed about that), the depicted wheels were quite diﬀerent across subjects.
24Theoretical arguments sustaining such a conjecture may for example be based on the theories of “team
reasoning” or “we thinking” by Sugden (1993) and Bacharach (1997), respectively.
25In particular, in the m0.5 model, strategies of no links are 3% in Wave 1, 4% in Wave 2, 2% in both
22Table 5: Frequencies of link-strategies across experimental waves
Wave 1: Long interaction / neutral label / no FK protocol
Total 0 link 1 link Link >1
plays (as proportions of total plays)
m0.5 420 0.03 0.74 0.23
m1.5 492 0.19 0.75 0.06
b0.5 480 0.25 0.69 0.06
b1.5 480 0.53 0.42 0.05
Wave 2: Long interaction / ordered label / no FK protocol
Total 0 link 1 link Link >1
plays (as proportions of total plays)
m0.5 384 0.04 0.79 0.17
m1.5 444 0.09 0.85 0.06
b0.5 420 0.22 0.67 0.11
b1.5 348 0.44 0.54 0.02
Wave 3: Short interaction / neutral & ordered labels / FK protocol
Total 0 link 1 link Link >1
plays (as proportions of total plays)
m0.5 - neutral 300 0.02 0.83 0.15
m1.5 - neutral 300 0.10 0.88 0.02
m0.5 - ordered 300 0.02 0.89 0.09
m1.5 - ordered 300 0.10 0.89 0.01
Values of Mann-Whitney tests for frequencies of one-link strategies. Wave 1 vs. Wave
2. m0.5: z=-1.785 (p=0.074); m1.5: z=-3.59 (p=0.0004); b0.5: z=0.869 (p=0.384); b1.5:
z=-3.395 (p=0.0007). Wave 1 vs. Wave 3 - neutral. m0.5: z=-3.434 (p=0.0007); m1.5:
z=-1.548 (p=0.1216); Wave 2 vs. Wave 3 - ordered. m0.5: z=-2.804 (p=0.0050); m1.5:
z=-4.434 (p=0.0000); Wave 3 neutral vs. Wave 3 - ordered. m0.5: z=-2.223 (p=0.0262);
m1.5: z=-0.128 (p=0.8983)
The Table also shows, however, that there are diﬀerences across treatments, in par-
ticular in regard to the number of one-link strategies. Two eﬀects seem speciﬁcally at
work. The ﬁrst is connected to labels: speciﬁcally, the results document that introducing
ordered labels had the eﬀect of increasing the frequecies of one-link strategies, both be-
tween the experiments of Wave 1 and Wave 2 (from 74% to 79% in m05, from 75% to 85%
in m1.5, from 42% to 54% in b1.5, and with the frequencies close in b0.5, namely 69%
in Wave 1 and 67% in Wave 2, but with Wave 2 counting twice as much the frequencies
the ordered and neutral treatments of Wave 3. In the m1.5 experiments, strategies of more than one links
have been played 6% of the times in both the experiments of Waves 1 and 2, and 2% and 1% in the neutral
and ordered treatments, respectively, of Wave 3. Regarding the b1.5 model, plays with more than one links
have frequencies of 5% in Wave 1, and 2% in Wave 2.
23of more than 1 link) and between the experiments of Wave 3 (from 83% in the neutral
treatment of m0.5 to 89% in the one with ordered labels, and from 88% to 89% between
the neutral and ordered treatments of m1.5). The second is due to the FK protocol: we
see that the frequencies of one-link strategies are higher in both the neutral and ordered
label experiments of Wave 3, than in the corresponding treatments of Wave 1 and Wave
2, respectively.
In all cases the diﬀerences in frequencies may perhaps look not particularly large,
but they are statistically signiﬁcant (see the Mann-Whitney tests reported at the bottom
of the Table). Especially, they have eﬀects which are deﬁnitively not negligible on the
emerging networks formed across treatments. This is in particular documented by Figure
4, which shows the frequencies of total links per network in the various experiments. Here
it is particularly interesting to focus on the mono-directional treatments, for which the
wheel equilibria require, as the very minimum condition, that networks must be based on
subjects playing one-link-strategies, hence of four links. The histograms indicate that the
diﬀerences in frequencies of one-link strategies played by subjects across treatments have
the implications of aﬀecting substantially the chance of having networks with four links. It
is for example worthwhile noticing that the diﬀerence of only 4% in the frequency of one-
link strategies between the m0.5 experiments of Wave 1 and Wave 2 has the implication
of lowering from about 60% to 40% the chance of having a four links network in Wave 1
rather than Wave 226.
Various reasons may explain the diﬀerences in the number of links established by
subjects across treatments. Learning is an obvious explanation for the diﬀerence in the
ﬁndings from the experiments of Waves 1 and 2 with respect to those of Wave 3, since
in the former waves subjects presumably needed a bit of practice before fully understand
the nature of the networking games, while the exposition to the FK protocol gave a
comparative advantage at the outset to subjects participating in Wave 3. In the latter
respect, it is interesting to look at the dynamics of link-strategies established by players
across treatments. These are shown in Figure 5, giving in particular the dynamics of the
frequencies of one-link and zero-link strategies across treatments (with the frequencies of
strategies with more than one link which can be obtained as complement to 1).
The diagrams of the mono-directional models conﬁrm that both in the ordered treat-
ments and in the treatments with participants being exposed to the FK protocol there is
more tendency of subjects to play one-link strategies. The diagrams, however, also indicate
that after some repetitions, even in the treatments without the FK protocol (namely of
Wave 1 and Wave 2) the proportions of one-link strategies increased toward higher levels.
Also interesting to notice in Figure 5, it is the clear tendency in the b1.5 experiments of
both Waves 1 and 2, of subjects reducing steadily the number of one-link strategies, while
26Obvioulsy, the greater propensity of subjects in Wave 2 rather than Wave 1 to play one-link strategies
may also partly explain the higher frequencies and slighlty quicker rates of convergence to the wheel
equilibrium in the mono-directional experiments of Wave 2 rather than of Wave 1 (see section 5.1.2).
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6increasing those of zero-link strategies. This evidence may well explain the emergence of
empty networks documented in section 5.1.2 for these treatments; and the dynamics may
in fact indicate that with more repetitions even more groups might have converged toward
the empty networks in the b1.5 experiments.
5.2.2 Salient plays
The question about why subjects in treatments with ordered labels played more often
one-link strategies than subjects in the neutral labelling condition is particularly inter-
esting. Two explanations are possible. On the one side, ordered labels may have simply
induced more general conﬁdence among subjects in the experiments about the possibility
of coordinating, which may have in turn generated more active behavior in the form of
attempted links27. Such an explanation could in fact give also reason to the diﬀerences in
the link-frequencies between the bi-directional treatments of Wave 1 and Wave 2. On the
other side, as emphasized throughout, in the mono-directional treatments ordered labels
may serve as an explicit coordination device; and even if the equilibrium results have doc-
umented that only subjects of Wave 3 coordinated on the salient wheel ABCD, it is still
possible that some or most subjects in Wave 2 have at least tried to play salient strategies.
Table 6 provides the data to answer such a question and to more generally analyze
the occurrence of salient plays in the mono-directional experiments with ordered labels.
The Table in particular gives the one-link strategies played by player-types A, B, C and
D in the mono-directional ordered treatments of Waves 2 and 3. The data are presented
pooling the results of the two models m0.5 and m1.5, since there were not signiﬁcant
diﬀerences across the models within each wave.
The ﬁrst blocks of data in the Table are for the whole sessions. The results of Wave
3 conﬁrm that subjects played salient strategies, with in particular 62% of the one-link
strategies of player A to B, 54% of player B to C, 58% of player C to D, and 64% of player
D to A. We tested whether the above frequencies are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1/3, which
is the value one may expect with subjects, conditional on choosing the one-link strategy,
connect to one of the other player at random. We see that they are highly signiﬁcant. On
the other hand, in Wave 2 we cannot reject the hypothesis that subjects choose to connect
at random amongst the other players28.
The other blocks of the Table shows how the one-link strategies have been played over
27Such an attitude could for example be explained in terms of the “variable frame theory of focal points”
(Bacharach and Bernasconi 1997). The theory in particular entails a principle of games playing called
Symmetry Disqualiﬁcation. It says that if two options are alike in all relevant respects, then a solution
strategy for the player should not pick one option rather than the other. Believing in such a principle, it
is then possible that subjects playing with neutral labels were not able to ﬁnd any reason to disqualify
among the symbols @, #, ∗, %, and hence played more often zero-link strategies; whereas subjects in the
ordered treatments might have found some reasons to disqualify amongst the more familiar letter symbols
A, B, C, D.
28Later we conduct a ﬁner test which also control for the eﬀects of inertia and various learning rules.
27Table 6: One-link strategies per player-type in mono-directional ordered treatments (pooled models m0.5, m1.5)
Wave 2 (Long interactation - ordered label - no FK protocol) Wave 3 (Short interaction - ordered label - FK protocol)
Player Total 1 link to: A B C D Player Total 1 link to: A B C D













A 207 0.88 0.01 0.34 0.25 0.41 A 150 0.93 0.00 0.62*** 0.15 0.23
B 207 0.86 0.35 0.00 0.39 0.26 B 150 0.87 0.23 0.00 0.54*** 0.23
C 207 0.73 0.36 0.26 0.02 0.35 C 150 0.85 0.24 0.17 0.01 0.58***





















A 60 0.80 0.02 0.33 0.27 0.38 A 50 0.90 0.00 0.64** 0.11 0.24
B 60 0.75 0.53 0.00 0.40 0.07 B 50 0.82 0.29 0.00 0.51 0.20
C 60 0.68 0.27 0.41 0.00 0.32 C 50 0.76 0.39 0.18 0.00 0.42





















A 60 0.88 0.00 0.32 0.21 0.47 A 50 0.92 0.00 0.59** 0.17 0.24
B 60 0.90 0.26 0.00 0.33 0.41 B 50 0.88 0.27 0.00 0.45 0.27
C 60 0.73 0.43 0.27 0.02 0.27 C 50 0.92 0.17 0.11 0.02 0.70***






















A 120 0.92 0.00 0.31 0.34 0.35 A 50 0.96 0.00 0.63** 0.17 0.21
B 120 0.88 0.33 0.00 0.42 0.25 B 50 0.92 0.13 0.00 0.65*** 0.22
C 120 0.77 0.44 0.14 0.02 0.40 C 50 0.88 0.18 0.23 0.00 0.59**














All 480 0.86 All 200 0.92
Note: ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denote in the order statistical signiﬁcance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, in a diﬀerence-of-proportion test that the frequency of
one-link from type-row to type-column players is greater than 1/3 (one-tailed test based on standard normal distribution).
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8the three sequences of Wave 3 and on three period-subsets of Wave 2 (periods 1-5, periods
6-10, and periods 11 to the end of the various sessions). We see that in all sequences
of Wave 3 subjects have to some extent played salient strategies; and we also see some
tendency of salient strategies to increase over the three sequences. (In particular, averaging
the frequencies of salient strategies across player-types, they are 54.3% in sequence 1, 59.8%
in sequence 2, 63.5% in sequence 3). At the contrary, again we don’t see any evidence of
salient plays in Wave 2, even across the three period-subsets.
We ﬁnd this evidence quite interesting, particularly in contrast to the fact that the
frequencies of one-link strategies have instead increased through the period-subsets (which
Table 6 conﬁrms from the evidence already documented in Figure 5). More speciﬁcally,
the intriguing result from Wave 2 is that if on the one side subjects seem to have learned
through repetitions the idea of playing one-link strategies (to possibly coordinate on a
wheel), they don’t seem to have learned to use letter labels to play salient coordination.
A possible explanation for the latter evidence is that for salient coordination is indeed
necessary some common knowledge about the strategic signicance of labels, which may
have been too diﬃcult to achieve by subjects learning individually, while it could have
been easier to be established in Wave 3 thanks to the question of the FK protocol, which
all subjects answered and all knew the others were also answering.
5.3 Models of learning dynamics
An other interesting question regarding subjects’ learning is about the way in which they
learn. In section 3.3 we have in particular recalled the speciﬁc model of learning dy-
namics made up by a mixture of Cournot Best Response and inertia taken by Bala and
Goyal (2000) to predict equilibrium convergence in their networking games. While the
equilibrium results have shown only weak evidence of convergence, it is still interesting
to consider whether subjects’ behaviour has in any way been driven by the Cournot Best
Response dynamics or, indeed, by some other learning rules proposed in the literature.
In particular, as it is well known, the Cournot Best Response is not the only possible
way of individual learning in repeated games. Rather, it represents the simplest version
of a more general class referred to as beliefs learning models, where players form beliefs
about what their opponents will do in the future based on past observations and best
respond to such beliefs. In Cournot Best Response, it is assumed that players only look
one period backwards. More articulated speciﬁcations in which players use longer history
of observed plays are known as models of Fictitious Play (as in Fudenberg and Levine
1998, or Cheung and Friedman 1997). A more diﬀerent approach is that of Reinforcement
learning, which doesn’t assume that players form beliefs about what others will do, but
simply takes that players choose with higher probabilities strategies which have achieved
higher returns in the past (Roth and Erev 1995, and Mookherjee and Sopher 1994 and
1997).
29The experimental evidence about how people actually behave and learn in games is
mixed. Various reasons may concur to explain the evidence. One which is receiving
increasing attention is due to an identiﬁcation problem typically arising in repeated games
with a small set of possible pure strategies, where the diﬀerent learning models do not
point to very distinct predictions in terms of subjects’ choices. This seems for example
a particularly serious drawback in 2 × 2 normal form games often used to compare the
various approaches (see e.g. Salmon 2001).
In order to trace down possible learning dynamics in the more complex networking
games studied in the present experiment29, we have computed for each subject in each
period of her session the predictions of the three learning models of Reinforcement, Cournot
Best Response, and Fictitious Play30.
We now present the evidence on the three models in three steps: we ﬁrstly give an
overlook of the evidence with which the three pure learning models have been played by
subjects in the experiments; then we look at the frequencies of plays falling in mutually
exhaustive classes of learning models, which may be important to control for the identi-
ﬁcation problem alluded to above; lastly we conduct some probit regressions to test the
extent to which the classes of learning models contribute to explain the actual strategies
played by subjects, when also controlling for factors like inertia and salient playing.
5.3.1 Pure learning models
Figure 6 reports the histograms of the frequencies of strategies falling under the three
pure models of learning (namely, R for Reinforcement, C for Cournot Best Response, and
F for Fictitious Play). The histograms also report bars for observed strategies which don’t
fall under any of the three models, distinguishing between other not-dominated strategies
(other) and dominated ones (dom.).
The histograms indicate that all learning models, in all treatments, capture some
relevant proportions of observed choices. In particular, as a ﬁrst measure of the impact
of the learning models, the histograms compare observed frequencies of learning models
depicted as dark bars with the gray bars corresponding to the frequencies which should
have been observed for each model when subjects are in fact randomizing over the set of
all not-dominated strategies under each treatment.
29See Camerer (2003, p. 473) for an ealier suggestion of the possibility of using richer strategic settings,
like indeed games of network formations, to obtain stronger experimental evidence on the type of learning
rules used by people in games.
30To obtain the predictions for Reinforcement, we have in particular adopted the most standard approach
(Erev and Roth 1998), in which propensities to play the various strategies are adapted linearly by adding
to previous period’s propensities the latter payoﬀs obtained; as in regards to Fictitious Play, we have
considered both a model of residual opponents, in which beliefs are formed in regard to likelihoods of
passed networks, and a model of individual opponents, where beliefs are formed in regard to passed plays
of all other players. Having, however, found that the diﬀerences between the two variants of Fictitious Play
don’t produce signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the ﬁndings, we report here results only for the former speciﬁcation.
More details on the speciﬁcations used to derive the predictions are given in Appendix B.
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Learning models: “R”=reinforcement; “C”=Cournot Best response; “F”=Fictitious play; “other”=other not-dominated strategies; “dom.”= dominated
strategies. Dark bars= observed choices; grey bars= expected choices when subjects choose randomly across not-dominated strategies.
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1The comparisons conﬁrm that, in all treatments, strategies consistent with learning
models have been chosen more often than those expected under random picking; while,
conversely, those observed for the other not-dominated strategies have been chosen less
often than expected under randomization31.
5.3.2 Mutually exclusive classes of learning models
As noted, an issue with the results from pure learning models is that they may suﬀer from
the problem of identiﬁcation due to the diﬀerent rules pointing to the same predictions.
As a way to address the problem, we have reclassiﬁed the observed strategies on the basis
of mutually exclusive classes of learning, represented by the all possible combinations of
the three pure learning models.
Table 7 reports the observed frequencies for the various classes and compares them
with the expected frequencies under random picking (the values in brackets in the Table,
with the asterisks denoting statistical signiﬁcance for the diﬀerence of proportion test
described in footnote 31). The reported ﬁgures provide interesting evidence. Three points
seem worth noticing. The ﬁrst is that the results are quite similar across all treatments.
Even if this evidence is exactly what one might expect from learning models, given that
by their very same nature learning models only depend on induction, and not on diﬀerent
principles of deductive reasoning a subject may use to play diﬀerent games, it is still
worthwhile to emphasize how neat are our results. The other two points concern the type
of evidence we observe. One major point is that subjects seem to generally favor strategies
which are supported by mixture, rather than pure learning models. That is particularly
transparent by the frequencies of strategies observed for the class combining predictions
of all three learning models, namely R&C&F, which in the aggregate of all treatments
accounts for almost three times the observations one should expect under random picking
(19.8% of observed choices versus 7% expected). We note that this result does not seem
to be due to the fact that the three learning models tend to collapse on the same set of
strategies32; but to a genuine preferences of subjects to play strategies supported by more
31We also conducted formal tests for the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences between observed
frequencies and expected frequencies under randomization. In particular, we conducted diﬀerence-of-
proportion tests derived under the null that participants are picking at random among not-dominated






, where h1 is the proportion of
observed choices consistent with the various learning models (computed with respect to the overall choices
N1 of each treatment) and h2 is the proportion of choices predicted by the models, computed with respect
to the total number N2 of non-dominated strategies which subjects could play under each treatment. Under
the null, d is distributed as a standard normal. The results of the tests indicate that, with the exceptions
of the Cournot Best response model in m1.5 of Wave 1 and b1.5 of Wave 2, and of Fictitious Play in m1.5
of Wave 1, in all other cases observed frequencies are signiﬁcantly higher than expected frequencies. More
detailed results are not reported for brevity; results of tests conducted for mutually exclusive classes of
learning models are reported below.
32In fact, a measure of the extent to which the pure learning models collapse to predict the same strategies
is given by the frequencies expected under random picking; we see that various mutually exclusive classes
count expected frequencies of similar order, but not all also count an equal number of observed choices.
32Table 7: Proportions of strategies across classes of learning models
R C F R&C R&F C&F R&C&F other dom. Tot.
Wave 1
m0.5 0.07* 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.12*** 0.15* 0.17*** 0.25*** 0.03 396
(0.04) (0.02) (0.16) (0.01) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.57)
m1.5 0.11* 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.11 0.16 0.13** 0.20*** 0.06 468
(0.07) (0.04) (0.20) (0.02) (0.08) (0.18) (0.09) (0.32)
b0.5 0.08*** 0.03 0.25 0.01 0.09** 0.21*** 0.09** 0.25*** 0.00 456
(0.04) (0.02) (0.25) (0.01) (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.46)
b1.5 0.08* 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.12*** 0.15 0.32*** 0.18*** 0.01 456
(0.06) (0.05) (0.17) (0.01) (0.06) (0.20) (0.12) (0.33)
Wave 2
m0.5 0.09** 0.02 0.19 0.01 0.10*** 0.12 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.03 360
(0.05) (0.02) (0.21) (0.01) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.50)
m1.5 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.10* 0.15 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.04 420
(0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (0.01) (0.07) (0.14) (0.12) (0.41)
b0.5 0.06** 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.11*** 0.21*** 0.12*** 0.22*** 0.00 396
(0.03) (0.01) (0.26) (0.00) (0.05) (0.14) (0.06) (0.44)
b1.5 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.16*** 0.18 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.01 324
(0.06) (0.04) (0.17) (0.01) (0.08) (0.22) (0.12) (0.30)
Wave 3
m0.5 neutr. 0.09* 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.13*** 0.12 0.16*** 0.41*** 0.01 240
(0.05) (0.02) (0.10) (0.00) (0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.64)
m1.5 neutr. 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.25*** 0.34*** 0.01 240
(0.107) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.04) (0.16) (0.11) (0.52)
m0.5 order. 0.09** 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08** 0.09 0.24*** 0.40*** 0.01 240
(0.04) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.03) (0.10) (0.05) (0.68)
m1.5 oder. 0.14** 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.25*** 0.34*** 0.01 240
(0.08) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.03) (0.15) (0.10) (0.54)
Legend. The number in brackets are the frequencies expected for the classes of learning models when
subjects choose randomly across not-dominated strategies.
∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denote in the order signiﬁcance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels in a diﬀerence-of-proportion test
in which the null hypothesis is that observed and expected choices when subjects choose randomly are
not statistically diﬀerent (for the classes of learning model the alternative hypothesis is that observed
choices are greater than expected; for the class of other not-dominated strategies the alternative is that
observed choices are lower than expected; in either cases the tests are based on the one-tailed standard
normal distribution).
33learning rules.
In the latter respect, as a third and ﬁnal point, we also observe that among the class
of pure learning models, Reinforcement is the one which comes out more strongly, not
only in combinations with the other models (in addition to the class R&C&F, also in the
class with Fictitious Play, namely R&F), but also when it delivers exclusive predictions;
Cournot Best response seems instead the one less followed.
5.3.3 Probit regressions for subjects’ strategies
As a further step to investigate the capability of learning models to explain subjects’
behavior, we have also conducted some regression analysis for the impact of learning rules
on the likelihood by which subjects choose speciﬁc strategies, while also controlling for the
eﬀect of inertia and salient plays.
In Table 8 we report a summary of the evidence. The table in particular show results
of probit regressions for the mono-directional experiments, conducted as follows33.
We have constructed standard dichotomous variables for the various strategies subjects
could play in the experiments, taking value one when a subject plays a given strategy and
taking value zero otherwise.
The probit for which we report results are either zero or one-link strategies. In the
Table, the strategy of zero-link is indicated as vector (0000); the strategies of one-link are
indicated with vectors of three ‘0’ and a ‘1’ in ordered positions to indicate the player
to which the link was directed to. For the ordered treatments the positions of the 1s
correspond to the ordered letter labels; thus, for example, vector (1000) indicates the
strategy of one link to player A, vector (0100) the strategy of one link to player B and so
forth.
We have studied the eﬀect on the probability of subjects’ playing the various strategies
of the mutually exclusive classes of the learning models. The regressions control for the
impact of inertia. For each strategy, the variable inertia takes the value one if the strategy
was played in the previous period and zero otherwise.
The regressions control also for the eﬀect of salient playing. The variable salience is
included only in the probit of the various one-link strategies of the ordered treatments and
is deﬁned in the obvious way. In particular, in the probit for strategy (1000), the variable
salience is one to identify player D, otherwise is zero; in the probit for strategy (0100),
salience is one for player A and 0 otherwise; and so forth.
The results presented in Table 8 are for the pooled models m0.5 and m1.5, distinguish-
ing between the treatments with neutral labels (adding together those of Waves 1 and 3),
the treatments with ordered labels of Wave 2 and the treatments with ordered labels of
33Results from the bi-directional models are not reported for brevity. They are available upon request;
they don’t add to the evidence shown here for the mono-directional models.
34Table 8: Probit regressions for strategies of zero and one-links in mono-directional experiments (pooled models m0.5, m1.5)
Neutral treatments of Waves 1 & 3 Ordered treatments of Wave 2 Ordered treatments of Wave 3
Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat. Strat.
(0000) (1000) (0100) (0010) (0001) (0000) (1000) (0100) (0010) (0001) (0000) (1000) (0100 (0010) (0001)
Inertia 0.140 0.192 0.045 0.110 0.010 0.026 0.161 0.072 0.068 0.416** -0.229 -0.027 0.107 0.268 0.248
(0.142) (0.099) (0.103) (0.101) (0.099) (0.382) (0.148) (0.152) (0.147) (0.148) (0.396) (0.153) (0.172) (0.169) (0.157)
R 1.086** 0.554** 0.547** 0.358 0.417* 1.232** 0.082 -0.014 0.713** 0.275 1.479** 0.419 0.209 0.362 0.535*
(0.163) (0.206) (0.184) (0.216) (0.167) (0.410) (0.404) (0.296) (0.247) (0.274) (0.328) (0.326) (0.268) (0.247) (0.222)
C - - 0.388 0.025 0.236 0.677 0.897* 0.354 0.571 -0.200 - - - - 0.073
(0.327) (0.288) (0.265) (0.458) (0.446) (0.294) (0.342) (0.565) (0.599)
F 0.657** 0.259 0.188 0.178 0.336* 0.005 0.232 0.131 0.181 0.466* -0.207 0.448 -0.499 -0.281 -0.362
(0.194) (0.134) (0.133) (0.128) (0.135) (0.365) (0.187) (0.182) (0.202) (0.190) (0.489) (0.233) (0.308) (0.262) (0.410)
R&C 0.435 0.998* 0.546 0.272 0.772 - 0.711 0.632 -0.067 0.747 - - - - -
(0.630) (0.453) (0.354) (0.704) (0.444) (0.483) (0.668) (0.601) (0.528)
R&F 1.052** 0.867** 0.648** 0.288 0.887** - 0.887** 0.490* 0.595* 0.413 - 0.910** 0.251 0.433 0.464
(0.225) (0.180) 0.175) (0.170) (0.159) (0.230) (0.244) (0.244) 0.249) (0.309) (0.298) (0.393) (0.280)
C&F 0.276 0.221 0.191 0.440** 0.180 0.299 0.673** 0.235 0.193 0.181 0.386 0.302 0.165 -0.157 0.071
(0.260) (0.134) (0.131) (0.123) (0.129) (0.562) (0.190) (0.184) (0.219) (0.202) (0.439) (0.204) (0.208) (0.215) (0.232)
R&C&F 1.045** 1.022** 0.969** 1.125** 0.915** - 1.213** 1.000** 1.103** 0.977** 1.453 1.273** 0.828** 0.602** 0.936**
(0.307) (0.156) (0.156) (0.151) (0.144) (0.220) (0.215) 0.219) (0.231) (0.899) (0.240) 0.234) 0.232) 0.221)
Salient plays - - - - - - -0.047 0.271* 0.089 -0.105 - 0.362* 0.605** 0.750** 0.557**
(0.129) (0.127) (0.134) (0.136) (0.166) (0.168) (0.183) (0.174)
c=0.5 -0.478** 0.120 0.035 0.009 -0.099 -0.289 -0.102 0.136 -0.127 0.090 -0.672** 0.078 0.045 0.120 -0.002
(0.145) (0.091) (0.090) (0.087) (0.086) (0.181) (0.124) (0.122) (0.125) (0.125) (0.245) (0.146) (0.151) (0.147) (0.143)
Constant -1.540*** -1.202** -1.140** -0.965** -0.963** -1.585** -1.029** -1.077** -1.018** -1.119** -1.543** -1.022** -1.068** -1.084** -1.084**
(0.095) (0.117) (0.109) (0.105) (0.101) (0.125) (0.157) (0.139) (0.173) (0.173) (0.144) (0.158) (0.152) (0.147) (0.149)
Obs. 1347 1001 1006 1005 1002 775 581 584 582 580 472 360 360 356 358
Pseudo R2 0.187 0.076 0.065 0.060 0.065 0.083 0.102 0.067 0.80 0.085 0.190 0.128 0.136 0.161 0.167
LR -329.0 -523.4 -533.1 -557.7 -579.5 -135.5 -289.3 -284.1 -284.6 -282.3 -91.1 -204.4 -187.5 -190.5 -197.1
Note: robust standard errors in brackets. ∗ and ∗∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at 5% and 1%, respectively. (Controls for classes of learning models are dropped when predict failure
perfectly).
3
5Wave 334. To account for the diﬀerence in the cost of connections, the regressions include
a dummy equals to 1 for the m0.5 experiments.
The regressions show the following. First of all, inertia has little eﬀect in explaining
the strategies chosen by subjects in the present experiment. Conversely, learning models
are conﬁrmed to be relevant to explain individual choices even after controlling for inertia.
Furthermore, among the various learning models, the class consistent with predictions of
all three learning rules (R&C&F) is again found to be the one most eﬀective to explain
subjects’ behavior across all strategies. Another class conﬁrmed generally signiﬁcant even
when yielding to exclusive predictions is that of Reinforcement.
Also interesting is the evidence about salient playing. The regressions for the ordered
treatments of Wave 2 conﬁrm that, even after controlling for learning, subjects in this
treatment have failed to use ordered labels strategically in the experiments; conversely,
the results from the ordered treatments of Wave 3 document the impact of salient playing
even after controlling for learning.
6 Summary and conclusions
We acknowledge that the evidence presented in the paper is complex and crosses various
streams of literature in game theory. We, however, believe that some relevant messages
can be traced out from the paper, which we summarize in following points.
1. We have started from the very neat theory of Bala and Goyal (2000) about networks
formation in a non-cooperative setting. We have conducted experiments of various
versions of the model and under various experimental conditions. At the very general
level, we have seen some emergence of equilibrium networks, but neither particularly
strong, nor homogeneous under the diﬀerent conditions. Also important at the gen-
eral level, we have clearly seen that only Strict Nash networks have some capability
to capture people behavior; but deﬁnitively not equivalently in the two ﬂow models,
as in the mono-directional model we have only seen emergence of non-Empty Strict
Nash networks, namely the wheel networks, while in the bi-directional model we
have only seen evidence of empty networks.
2. We have studied more particularly two behavioral rules of games playing applied
to networks: salient playing and individual learning dynamics. Regarding salient
playing, we have seen that using ordered letter labels A, B, C, D rather than neutral
labels to identify subjects in the networks seems to have a general positive eﬀect in
helping subjects to better focusing on the experimental tasks and perhaps increase
their conﬁdence in doing well in the networks. In particular, we have seen that with
34Regressions on the individual treatments don’t add to the evidence presented. They are available on
request.
36ordered labels subjects are more conﬁdent to play strategies of one rather than zero
link, which in the mono-directional model is the obvious pre-requisite for them to
coordinate on a wheel.
3. Quite interestingly, however, we have also seen that ordered labels are not enough
to induce salient coordination in the mono-directional model (meaning that subjects
take part in a wheel in which A connect to B, B to C, C to D, and D to A).
But other conditions appear important. First of all, subjects need to be somehow
pre-instructed to think at the wheel network as a reasonable way of playing the
game; secondly, it seems necessary some common knowledge that all members of the
network have been similarly pre-instructed. On the contrary, we have seen that when
subjects learn by themselves to play the game, they never play salient strategies, even
in the few cases in which they converge to a wheel equilibrium.
4. Indeed, regarding individual learning dynamics, we have seen that learning dynamics
can sometimes also bring to equilibrium convergence, both to the wheel networks
in the mono-directional model and to the empty networks in the bi-directional one.
In neither case, however, convergence appears very quick or general, though in the
bi-directional case we have found some signals that with longer repetitions even more
groups might have converged toward the empty networks.
5. We have also studied more speciﬁc models of learning dynamics. We have ﬁrst of all
recalled how Bala and Goyal (2000) provided themselves a model of learning dynam-
ics based on a mixture of inertia and Cournot Best response, to predict convergence
toward the Strict Nash equilibria in both ﬂow models. We have found little sign
of inertia and have seen that subjects played Cournot Best response strategies only
when they were also supported by other learning rules. In fact, we have found more
support for subjects playing Reinforcement strategies and, especially, for subjects
playing strategies jointly sustained by a combination of learning models, including
as the main ones again Reinforcement and Fictitious play. We have noticed that in
the present experiment such result doesn’t depend so much on an “identiﬁcation”
problem sometimes emphasized in the literature and arising when diﬀerent learning
rules tend to overlap on the same small set of strategies; rather it seems to be due to
a genuine predisposition of subjects to play strategies supported by various learning
rules. In view of the relevance of learning models in economics, we consider also this
latter result as an interesting by-product of the present experiment.
6. Compared to the previous evidence obtained on the same model by Falk and Kos-
feld (2003), the present paper provides some conﬁrmation, but also some major
diﬀerences. The main conﬁrmation is that even if the wheel networks and the
center-sponsored star networks in the two ﬂow models rest on equivalent equilib-
rium notions from a purely game theoretic perspective, the latter network in the bi-
37directional model seems to be deﬁnitively aﬀected by a too large payoﬀ-asymmetry
to be chosen by subjects in the experiments35. The main diﬀerences are that Falk
and Kosfeld (2003) report wheel networks in the mono-directional case at a much
higher rate than we do, while they don’t ﬁnd any evidence of empty networks even
in the bi-directional model.
7. Part of the explanation of the diﬀerences clearly stems from diﬀerences in the treat-
ment conditions, as in particular all of Falk and Kosfeld’s experiments were run with
ordered labels and with subjects being exposed to a protocol encouraging them to
think about the wheel network, which we have only used in one of our experimen-
tal wave; in addition, they used quite short experimental sessions, so that subjects
might have had not enough time to learn about playing the empty networks in
the bi-directional case. We have also noticed that other details in the instructions
and in the conduction of the experiments might have improved the perfomance of
subjects in Falk and Kosfeld’s experiments and perhaps also induced a somehow
more cooperative behavior (namely, to always partecipate in the salient wheel in
the mono-directional case, without perhaps experimenting the possibility of higher
payoﬀs with diﬀerent strategies; and to avoid playing strategies of zero link in the
bi-directional games).
8. All along, also the above explanations conﬁrm that the study of network formation
is a very fascinating theme for experimental research, but also very challenging since
even slight diﬀerences in the experimental conditions may cause quite divergent
results. And, obviously, if this occurs in the lab, even more important the impact
of labels, frames, people’s mental attitude and their common knowledge can be in
the formation of social networks in the real world. Neglecting considerations of such
aspects may produce serious drawbacks in our understanding of the circumstances
which may favor the formation of social networks in the real world.
35Falk and Koslfeld (2003) also note that two basic mechanisms may be considered in the center-
sponsored star to reduce the problem of payoﬀ-asymmetry: one is that of introducing special rewards
for the central player; the other is that of rotating the role of the central agent in the networks. They also
quote various examples from the literature on sociology, psychology, and anthropology showing that such
systems are sometimes adopted in real world situations. We add that the two systems have obviolsuy very
diﬀerent implications for the Bala and Goyal model, as the mechanism of giving an extra-compensation
to the central agent alters completely the strategic nature of the game, while the rotation of the role of
the central agent requires a quite high level of coordination among agents. Regarding the latter and based
on the evidence provided in this paper, we suspect that such a level of cordination could only be obtained
with a very high degree of common knowledge, possibly only obtained through pre-communication.
38Appendix
A Example of the instruction for the experiment
The experiments were conducted in Italian. You ﬁnd here a translation of the instructions
for the experiment on the mono-directional ﬂow model with low cost (m0.5) conducted in
Wave 1. The instructions for the other treatments were changed accordingly.
Welcome to an experiment in economic decision-making
The present experiment is devoted to the study of network formation processes in
which valuable information is transmitted.
The experiment consists of a series of periods in which you should make decisions.
If you follow carefully the following instructions and make good decisions, you can
earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid in cash at the Bank ... of the
Universit` a dell’Insubria....
In the room there are instructors to whom you can ask to clarify any doubt. If you
have any question, raise your hand and wait that an instructor contacts you.
An experiment on information transmission
In this experiment you will always interact with other three participants. During the
whole experiment these participants will remain the same. During the experiment you are
asked not to speak in any way with the other participants.
Each participant is represented by one of the following symbols: @, #, *, %. You will
only be informed about your symbol at the beginning of the experiment. Your symbol
will only be known by yourself. Do not communicate to anyone else your identity.
In the experiment each participant has some information that only he is aware of. The
exact nature of the information is irrelevant to gain in the experiment. What is important
is that the information owned by each participant is worth 1 point. This value is the same
for every participant.
You have immediate access to your information, without having to take any action.
Instead, to access the information owned by the other participants, you have to com-
municate with them.
You can only access the information held by another participant if there exists a
connection that allows the information transmission between you and him.
Be aware that you can access the information held by another participant, both through
a direct connection (for instance, you are @ and # is directly connected with you) or
through a connection chain (for instance you, @, are connected with * while * is connected
with #).
It is important to remember that the information is transmitted in just one direction.
If you are, directly or indirectly, connected with #, the information held by # will arrive
to you but not the other way round. In fact, if # want to observe your information, he or
she has to be connected with you, either directly or indirectly.
Remember that the value of the information you accede does not depend of the number
of connections that allow you to observe it.
Connection Cost
39To open a connection is costly.
Is you decide to establish a direct connection with another participant you must spend
an amount equivalent to 0,5 points.
Your total costs amount 0,5 points times each direct connection you establish.
If you decide not to open a connection with anyone you do not have to pay any-
thing. Remember that you observe your information automatically without the need of
any connection.
An example
You can think of the connections between you and the others as arrows from them to
you. The arrow indicates that the information of the others is ﬂowing in your direction.
The arrows form a network which shows the information ﬂows between the players.
The arrows of the network can also show which player has created a connection. Indeed,
for each arrow, the player to which the arrow is pointing toward is the one that has created
that connection, bearing the cost.
Try to observe the information transmission and the connection costs of the following
network:
                   %                     # 
  @             *
                   
First of all observe the number of connections opened by each player.
You can observe the number of direct connections established by a player simply by
counting the number of arrows pointing in his or her direction. Hence, you can observe
that
% has not established any connection,
nor # has established any connection,
@ has established just one connection (with * ),
* has established two connections (one with # and another with @).
You can now calculate the total cost of the connections made by each player, multi-
plying by 0,5 points the number of connections he has established:
% does not spend anything,
# does not spend anything,
@ spends 0,5 points
* spends 1 point
Now think on how the information are transmitted in the observed network. Remember
that the information circulate in the same direction of the arrow.
This means that the information of # ﬂows in a direct way to * , but not vice versa.
Moreover, from the moment that there exists an arrow from * to @, it means that *
observes directly also the information of @.
Note that in this case @ is really able to observe the information of * from the moment
that he has decided to establish a connection with *.
40You also have to consider how the information are transmitted through indirect connec-
tions. As a matter of fact, through *, @ can also have access indirectly to the information
of #. However you can see that the opposite is not true.
Player % is instead isolated, as he or she has not established any connection. Never-
theless, remember that each player always observes his or her own information.
Thus, to summarize the number of information observed by each player through the
network, we can say that,
# only observes his or her own information
* and @ each observe 3 information (their own and those from the other two
players) through direct or indirect connections.
% only observes his or her own information
Proﬁt
The experiment of network formation will be repeated several times.
What you will earn from participating in the experiment depends on the type of net-
work to be formed in each period.
In particular, the proﬁt of each participant on each period will be given by the value
of all information observed by him or her in that period through direct and indirect
connections, minus the total cost of the direct connections established by him or her.
The proﬁt of each player in each period will then be calculated by counting the num-
ber of information observed and attributing to each 1 point. To this amount it will be
subtracted 0,5 points for each direct connection established by him or her.
In the above example it is easy to calculate the points obtained by each participant:
% earns 1 point: observes only one information, his or own, and does not bear
any cost.
# also earns 1 point: observes only his or her information and does not spend
anything.
* earns 2 points: he or she observes 3 information and spends 1 point for the two
connections.
@ earns 2,5 points: he or she observes 3 information and spends 0,5 points in one
connection.
The total amount for participating in the experiment will then be given by the sum of
all points obtained in each period, converted in euro.
In particular, in each period the points earned will be converted in euro through the
following rule:
Euro = (Points)*0.5
The payment for the participation in the experiment will be done after the experiment
conclusion.
A computer support for the experiment
Hence, the experiment consists of deciding on the connections to be established with
the other participants in a sequence of periods. To assist you on your decisions, we have
prepared a computer support.
41At the beginning of the experiment, a ﬁrst screen will communicate you whether you
are @ , # , * or %. This identity will remain the same during the whole experiment. Thus,
the proper and true experiment will be started with the periods sequence.
In every period, you will be given two successions of screens: in the ﬁrst you should
make your choice; in the second you will be communicated the network structure and the
earned points in that period.
The screen for your choice in the experiment
In each period of the experiment you will be asked to decide whether to establish a
direct connection and with whom of the other participants you want to establish a direct
connection. To make your choices you will have up to 2 minutes in each period.
You can make your choice by using one computer screen in front of you. Figure 1
represents a typical screen to make your choice.
The screen reminds you who you are (@ or # or * or %); it is numbered according to
the period you are in; and it indicates you the remaining time to make your choice. For
example, the ﬁgure refers to a hypothetical player #, in period 1, that still has 29 seconds
to make his or her own choice.
On the top of the screen you will ﬁnd the most important information to have in mind
when you make your choice: that each connection costs 0,5 points; and that you observe
your own information automatically without needing any connection.
42The screen thus reminds you that it is not advisable to activate a connection with
yourself.
On the bottom of the screen, there are four cells with a similar label: Your connections
to *, Your connections to %, Your connections to @, Your connections to #. Underneath
each of these cells there is an empty space to introduce your choice.
In particular,
If you intend to establish a connection with a speciﬁc player you should insert “1”
in the empty space under the cell that corresponds to his symbol.
If instead you intend to create no connections with a speciﬁc player you should
insert “0” in the empty space under the cell that corresponds to his symbol.
0 and 1 are the only accepted characters by the computer. If you insert any other
character an error message will show up.
You can always modify your choices until time expires. When you have decided
deﬁnitely on all connections, you have to conﬁrm your choice by pressing the button
Conﬁrm.
The results screen, with the network structure and the proﬁts
After having taken your decision, you will receive a waiting message. When all partic-
ipants have taken their decisions on the direct connections, the network will be formed.
The computer will then show a screen with the network formation and the points earned
by each player. This will occur with a screen like the one on Figure 2.
43The screen shows a table. Each row of this table corresponds to one of the four players:
* , % , @ , # .
All rows have cells.
If inside a cell there is 1 it means that the player of that row has decided to establish
a connection with the player represented in column.
If inside a cell there is 0 it means that the player of that row has decided not to
establish a connection with the player represented in column.
The connections made by you and by the other players of the group determine the
structure of the network and the payoﬀ points earned by each player. These are shown in
the last column on the right of the connections table.
Figure 2 refers for example to a period in which it was formed a network with the
following characteristics:
Player * has established a connection with # and one with @. His proﬁt is 2
points
Player % hasn’t established any connection with any of the other players. His
proﬁt is 1 point.
Player @ has established one connection with *. His proﬁt is 2,5 points.
Player # hasn’t established any connection with any of the other players. His
proﬁt is 1 point.
Please note that these are the same characteristics of the network represented with the
graph of the previous example. In fact, the network is the same.
The screen does not show the graph of the network. You ﬁnd next to your computer
sheets of paper to draw yourself the graph of network (see Figure 7). You can also copy
in the empty table the direct links formed by you and the other players, with the points
earned by each in the period.
The latter operation will among other things be useful to control your total proﬁt for
all periods in the experiment.
How the experiment keeps on
After you have observed the structure of the network and the earned points for a
suﬃcient amount of time, the experiment will go into the successive period. Again all
participants should take decisions, a network will be formed and will give origin to proﬁts
that will be communicated by the computer through a new screen of results.
End of the experiment
The experiment will go on for a number of periods, until it appears a diﬀerent screen
in the computer. On this screen you will be asked to ﬁll in some information useful for
your payment.
The computer will then calculate the amount you have earned for participating in
the experiment, converting the total scored points in euro through the formula previously
indicated.
You can withdraw your payment for the participation in the experiment in the oﬃce
of Bank... of the Universit` a dell’Insubria, address...
44Figure 7: The sheet to report results and draw the network
Copy the screen of the results with the point-payoffs earned  by each player, 
  @  %  #  *  Payoff-points 
Links formed by @ to:            Payoff earned by @:     
Links formed by % to:          Payoff earned by %:     
Links formed by #  to:          Payoff earned by #:     
Links formed by *  to:          Payoff earned by *:     
Draw the graph of the network resulting from the screen of the results. Consider the direction of the 
arrows.
  @      % 
  #      * 
45A.1 Control protocol along the style of Falk and Kosfeld (2003) - in-
cluded only in the ordered and neutral tratments of Wave 3
Please answer the following questions. Your answers bear no concequences on payments.
They serve only to verify if you understand the instructions. Please rise your hand when
you have done.
Question 1. The following direct links were formed:
Type A to: B, C
Type B to: A
Type C to: B
Type D to: A, B
Please insert the links resulting from these decisions in the following diagram. Consider
the direction of the arrows.
A      B
C  D
Calculate the cost, the information observed by each member of the network, the









Question 2. The following direct links were formed:
Type A to: B, C, D
Type B to: C, D
Type C to: B, D
Type D to: A, B
Please insert the links resulting from these decisions in the following diagram. Consider
the direction of the arrows.
46A      B
C  D
Calculate the cost, the information observed by each member of the network, the









Question 3. What links should, in your opinion, be formed to ensure the best possible
ﬂow of information and the maximum income to all group members?
The following direct connections should be initiated:
Type A to: B, C
Type B to: A
Type C to: B
Type D to: A, B
Please insert these links in the following diagram.
A      B
C  D
What were your considerations?
47B Models of learning
B.1 Reinforcement (R)
In Reinforcement model, in the ﬁrst period each player i = 1,...,I has an initial propensity
to play any n of her Ni strategies. Such a propensity is represented by qin (t) for any period
of time t. Strategies with higher propensity are played with higher probability. The




It is usually assumed that all initial propensities are strictly positive, so that at all times
there is a positive probability of a strategy being picked.
In all our experimental games, I = 4, and the set of strategies is the same for all agents,
Ni = N for any i, with |N| = 16. Moreover, in order to guarantee the propensities staying
always strictly positive even in the (unlikely) case of repeated plays of a dominated strategy
with negative payoﬀ, we have assumed that in any game ∀i, qin (1) = 22 × 2.5 = 55. Any
other choice would only re-scale the quantitative ﬁndings with no substantial eﬀects.
Any learning model also needs an updating rule. In this paper we only focus on the
standard basic reinforcement model, where the propensities are updated by adding to the
previous propensity the payoﬀ x received in period t by playing strategy n. Formally, the
updating rule is ￿
qin (t + 1) = qin (t) + x if n is played at t
qim (t + 1) = qim (t) ∀m  = n
,
that is, only nth propensity is changed. The reason is that, since the actions other than n
were not chosen, the payoﬀ they would have received could not be observed. Also note that
the parameterization of the initial propensity qin (1) = 55 takes care of the existence of
negative payoﬀs in the experimental games and rules out the technical problem of possibly
negative propensities as well as of not deﬁned probabilities by introducing a diﬀerence
among reinforcements and payoﬀs in the spirit of Erev and Roth (1998).
B.2 Belief learning
A standard formalization of belief learning is commonly used in literature for the case
of two-players games, I = 2. Each subject i’s beliefs about her opponent’s actions can
be represented by a vector vi containing a number of elements equal to the rank of the
particular payoﬀ matrix used in the game. Each element represent the weight player i
places on her opponent choosing each of her pure strategies. Thus vin (t) represents the
weight that player i gives to her opponent playing pure strategy n in period t. It is then
immediate to sort out the probability with which player i believes her opponent will play
strategy n by computing πin (t) =
vin(t)
P
m vim(t). The player then chooses the pure strategy
that is a best response to the probability distribution. In case of tie, the player is assumed
to choose randomly between all the possible best response strategies.
Two possible extensions to the more general case of I > 2 players are possible. The
ﬁrst it is to compute an n×(I − 1) matrix Vi (t) for each player i, containing the weight i
is placing on each of her I −1 opponents playing each pure strategy. In such an individual
opponent belief learning, player i is then choosing that particular strategy which is a best
response to the combination of the most probable pure strategies by each of her opponents.
In our network formation games this formally implies to, ﬁrst, identify the highest element
vinj (t) for each j column of the matrix, and then to select i’s best response to a network
formed by the other 3 opponents each playing their most probable strategies vinj (t).
48Note, however, that this generalization of belief learning to our four-players games
implies that subjects would experience in each repeated game not only a relatively time-
consuming eﬀort on computational operations, but also a rather sophisticated kind of
learning: in fact, being the network to which best respond exclusively formed by the op-
ponents’ most probable strategies, it may well occur that indeed that particular network
has never been observed in the past. In other words, the feature of being mainly an ab-
stract procedure based on joint probability distributions, which in theory may draw purely
virtual networks to respond to, makes individual opponent belief learning not particularly
appealing in terms of understanding of real subjects’ behavior.
At the contrary, an alternative generalization of belief learning to network formation
games with I players, is based on the idea that subjects are able to observe the structures
have been formed in the past and may easily observe how often a particular residual
network has emerged. That is, the residual opponent belief learning assumes that in four-
players games, for instance, each subject only keeps track of the observed combinations of
the pure strategies played by all three her opponents and behaves as facing and reacting




vi(−i) (t) needs to be compiled by each player: any element vi(n,m,...,l)(−i) (t) represents the
weight that player i gives to the possible residual network formed when her opponents are
playing respectively pure strategies n,m,...,l in period t.
Despite one may argue that this generalization would also be rather demanding in
terms of computational time, as it would require each subject ﬁlling all the (16)
3 = 4096
elements of her vector, it should be underlined, at the contrary, that the computation only
occurs with combinations of strategies corresponding to residual networks as observed in
the past: thus while all the unobserved residual networks simply get zero weights, players
are only supposed to keep track of one structure for period of time, which in standard
experiments seems to be a more than reasonable requirement.
In the data analysis of our four-persons experimental games, we have computed for
each subject both the generalizations of belief learning. However, having found that, with
extremely few exceptions, they perfectly overlap on the same probability distributions, in
the following we only refer to the vector formulation of the residual opponent model.
The variants of belief learning typically diﬀer only on the way they model how the
belief vector vi(−i) (t) is updated.
B.2.1 Fictitious play (F)
In the pure deterministic Fictitious Play learning model that we adopt, begins with setting
zero weights on any combination of strategies and residual networks, vi(−i) (0) = [0];
therefore, subjects choose randomly in the ﬁrst period. For all the subsequent periods,
let y∗ = [n∗,m∗,...,l∗] being the choices of all player i’s opponents in period t − 1. The
Fictitious Play learning model, then, updates the belief vector by setting
￿
viy∗(−i) (t) = viy∗(−i) (t − 1) + 1 with y∗ = [n∗,m∗,...,l∗] chosen at t − 1
vix(−i) (t) = vix(−i) (t − 1) ∀x  = y∗ .
Thus, a player who learns according to the Fictitious Play model uses the entire history
of opponents’ past strategies to form her beliefs. Subjects’ beliefs are simply the observed
frequency with which all her opponents have simultaneously used each combination of
their individual strategies.
49B.2.2 Cournot Best Response (C)
Alternatively, the Cournot Best Response model assumes that players update their beliefs
setting ￿
viy∗(−i) (t) = 1 with y∗ = [n∗,m∗,...,l∗] chosen at t − 1
vix(−i) (t) = 0 ∀x  = y∗ .
In other words, a player learning according to Cournot Best Response uses only the
observation from the most recent period to form beliefs. It is immediate to see that,
this type of learning, by treating each subject as assuming her opponents will play with
certainty the same combination of strategies they did in the previous period, perfectly
corresponds to what Bala and Goyal call naive best response dynamics.
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